CO129-590-25 Accounts of events leading up to surrender and subsequent treatment of prisoners- etc 23-4-1942 - 28-9-1943 — Page 168

SECRET.

A REPORT ON THE CONDITIONS IN HONG KONG SUBSEQUENT TO THE

SURRENDER, AND ON THE EVENTE WHICH LÄRD UP TO MY ESCAPE

FROM THE PRISON-OF-WAR CAMP IN SHAM-3HUL-PO,

by

Lieut. Colonel L.T. Ride, 0.C., tiong Kong Field Ambulance,

196

While the main theme of this report is the Japanose attitude towards the military prisoners in the camps in the Colony of Long Kong, it is proposed to set out first certain personal experiences during the period prior to the establishment of the prison camps, for these incidenta had not a little to do with the opinion I formed of the motives underlying the subsequent Japanese attitude.

2.

FERIUD 25th - 29th DEORDER, 1941.

For a few days prior to the capitulation, Field Ambuïance headquarters were located in the basement of the Yar Hemorial Mospital. Throughout hostilities it was my experience that on the whole the enemy restricted tile accurate attention of their artillery and bombers to atriotly military targets; hence the shelling to which the War Memorial and the Matilda Hospitals were subjcoted between 1400 and 1500 hours on the 25th, indiosted a definite and purposive change in attitude. On that day I had not been informed of the morning truce (for it was certainly not universally observed over the whole of the island,) but I now consider it more than likely that the Japanese, knowing that pressure on the civilian side (these hospitals were in the beginning civilian hospitals but of course eventually were used for military casualties) right tip the scale in favour of surrender, purosely embarked on a modified plan of frightfulness. This incident I consider significant, for it indicates that thic Japanese fight according to the rules of warfare only 30 long as it suits then. The argument so often heard in the prison camp that "when things sottle down they will treat us better" was therefore fallacious and a mere expression of a pious but doomed hope. The Japanese reverted to tyve at 1400 hours on the 25th December when they knew we were absolutely at their mercy and completely cut off from world opinien to which they are so susceptible because of their characteristic inferiority complex.

3.

After the surrender I considered it the duty of my unit to search the hills for our rounded which we knew must be lying there in mumbers, and for this reason I kept the Field Ambulance deployed although other units were falling back to concentration areas. Permission to searon for wounded was however not forthcoming ininly because F.1.Q. could not contact the Japanese authorities who were apparently not in the least interested in our rounded.

All telephonic communication between my H.y. and B.H.Q. wag. severed at 1100 hours on the 26th, and as my posts were the only ones manned by British troops in many arcas, I decided to concentrate my personnel at two points, (a) those from posts on the lower levels at the University, and (b) those from posts on the higher levels at my headquarters. Repeated personal attents to et orders from the 4.D.M.3. vere made on the afternoon of the 26th and on the morning of the 27th, but each time without result.

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